Philosophy of Science: Why Theory? (AZT, Chapter 1)

Karl R. Popper, 1980

In his Logic of Scientific Discovery, the scientific theorist Karl Popper writes:

The empirical sciences are systems of theories. One could call epistemology the theory of theories (Popper 1969: 31).

Several facts correspond to this epistemological understanding of science. Modern empirical science, unlike the late medieval scholasticism of Meister Eckhart (Harrington 2018), must proceed logically and empirically verifiable. However, statements can be empirically tested more easily the more generally valid and specific they are—that is, the higher their empirical content (Popper 1969: 86). Therefore, science strives to develop the most meaningful (and thus the most easily verifiable) theory possible.

Scientific puzzles and paradigm shifts relate to questions, concepts, typologies, and explanatory models—in short, theory (from the ancient Greek theoria: intuition, observation, knowledge). Accordingly, the dynamics of scientific knowledge require theories.

Analysis means cognitively breaking down and reconstructing objects of study according to a framework theory—see, for example, chemical analysis based on the model of the periodic table. Analysis therefore requires not only expertise and appropriate research methods, but also a theoretical framework conducive to knowledge.

Dynamic theory building requires free scientific thought and communication. Open theory building, in turn, represents effective academic freedom.

The rise of the natural sciences and the resulting enormous dynamic of technological innovation can be understood as a historical, at times enormously difficult, process of establishing free theory formation. In the social sciences, especially political science, theory formation, by contrast, has enjoyed only a low status to this day. Indeed, the idea prevails that science should be directly practice-oriented. Thus, Karl Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it" (Marx 1845), still dominates the entrance hall of the Humboldt University of Berlin in golden letters—an expression of a profound lack of understanding of what constitutes science in particular.

Online source: Nordbayern.de

Above all, however, the idea of interdisciplinary practice orientation increasingly dominates the funding and design of the social sciences. Instead of advancing knowledge, the power of those who determine what is feasible increasingly dominates; instead of scientific knowledge dynamics, there is, at best, fragmented praxeological optimization, often bureaucratic stagnation or regression.

This results in a fatal disproportion: While the natural and technical sciences are developing at a rapid pace and changing the world ever more rapidly and profoundly, the political and social sciences are stagnating and are even losing all independence and innovative power in more and more countries.

The rapid technological progress thus appears merely as a variable of present and future (geopolitical) power, and politics is increasingly losing its emancipatory power and commitment to responsibility.

In contrast, the theory of civility is aimed at gaining knowledge in the sense of empirical-analytical science: to develop and make verifiable statements of greater generalisability and accuracy (higher empirical content).

Literature:

AZT: Prittwitz, Volker von: General Theory of Civility, Berlin: Civility gUG, August 2025,

Harrington, Joel F. 2018: Meister Eckhart: The Monk Who Challenged the Church and Found His Own Path to God, Siedler, Munich

Marx, Karl 1845: Theses on Feuerbach (from Marx's Notebook)

Popper, Karl R. 1969: The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Tübingen: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), first edition 1934

Personal Comment (VP)

This text is diametrically opposed to the prevailing opinion, even among students. I sincerely hope that a public debate about this issue will finally begin, both in academic and political circles.